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A B S T R A C T
We investigate the impact and the possible consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We
model the European gas network as a cooperative game between regions as players over the pipeline network.
Our model offers several novelties compared to earlier cooperative studies. Firstly, we focus on cost saving
rather than on the profits of cooperation. Secondly, we introduce liquefied natural gas as a player. Thirdly,
we apply an iterative linear program to account for the long term bilateral contracts that still drive the gas
market. This modelling technique also allows us to identify individual gas flows. We focus on the change of
influence of the players in three different scenarios. We investigate how the power of the agents shift when
the Nord Stream pipeline is expanded, when the Ukrainian pipeline is shut down and finally when both of
these happen. Our calculations show that when Nord Stream 2 is operational, Russia and Western Europe
improve their position compared to the base scenario, while other suppliers, notably Norway, together with
Central- Eastern- and Southern Europe suffer losses, especially when the Ukrainian route is dismissed. The
results highlight that both the supporters and adversaries of Nord Stream 2 are governed by self-interest and
solidarity and trust, the values proclaimed by the EU and the Energy Union, remain but a slogan.
1. Introduction
Satisfying Europe’s hunger for energy has always been a difficulty.
Despite efforts to increase the use of renewable sources, with the
mounting sentiment against nuclear energy, reliance on fossil fuels
is more important than ever. Natural gas is, in particular, a very
versatile energy source with extensive industrial and domestic uses.
Nearly three-quarters of the European Unions natural gas consumption
is imported and 40% of the total import comes from Russia (European
Commission, 2014).
To combat this weakness, the European Union (EU) has established
a strategic plan for secure, affordable and environmental-friendly en-
ergy for all its citizens. As part of this plan, the Third Energy Package,
adopted in 2009, has the goal to open up the internal electricity and
gas markets of the European Union. It pushes for a separation of energy
production and transmission, stipulates the establishment of national
regulatory authorities and creates the Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators. Solidarity in energy matters is a key point in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as in the
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Energy Union. In fact, the first point of the EU’s energy union strategy
is: security, solidarity and trust.1 In the 2014 Energy Security Strategy
Communication the European Commission clearly declared how this
should be interpreted.
‘‘Government interventions that affect this market framework, such
as national decisions on renewable energy or efficiency targets,
decisions to support investment in (or decommissioning of) nuclear
generation, or decisions to support key infrastructure projects (such
as Nord Stream, South Stream, TAP or a Baltic LNG terminal) need
to be discussed at European and/or regional level to ensure that
decisions in one member state do not undermine security of supply
in another member state’’. (European Commission, 2014)
Natural gas is commonly transported via a network of national
and international pipelines. The Nord Stream pipeline, which connects
Russia and Germany, respectively the largest supplier and consumer
in Europe, became operational in 2011. Nord Stream 1 has already
led to political tensions within the EU: Central European Member
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States viewed it as a Trojan horse, a way to undermine the region’s
diversification efforts (European Policy Strategy Centre, 2016). The
EU introduced restrictions allowing the pipeline to be utilized at only
27.5 from 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) or half of its capacity. Re-
cently the limitations were lifted, utilization reached 93% by 2017 and
negotiations started to double transmission capacity to 110 bcm.
By August 2018, the project received permits from Russia, Finland,
Sweden and Germany, but not yet from Denmark. To prevent fur-
ther delay, Gazprom identified an alternative route avoiding Danish
territorial waters and started the construction. A year later, three
quarters of the work was completed and soon Denmark gave consent
to construct the pipeline through her continental shelf area. Meanwhile
the US threatened participating companies with sanctions and as a final
twist Swiss pipelay contractor Allseas halted work. Gazprom remained
adamant that they will find a solution to complete the pipeline. We
study the consequences of opening Nord Stream 2.
Propagators of Nord Stream 2 argue that the project is commercially
viable.
⊕ Declining European production capacities cannot meet rising net
demand.
⊕ Nord Stream 2 helps to lower gas prices in the EU.
⊕ Key pipelines in Ukraine are reaching the end of their service life
and lack viable alternatives.
⊕ Ends the uncertainty of the Ukrainian transit route.
What are the main arguments against the project?
⊖ Does not diversify the EU’s energy supply.
⊖ Adds to an infrastructure overcapacity in the EU.
⊖ Undermines the economic sanctions towards Russia.
⊖ Incompatible with the Energy Union’s strategic goals and with the
Third Energy Package.
Let us elaborate on the above points.
The demand for natural gas has declined in Europe during the 2010–
2013 period largely due to the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent
recession and the migration of manufacturing industry to other world
regions, but the lack of population growth and high prices have also
contributed to the effect. Although there is currently an oversupply in
the market, the trend has already reversed. Asia continuously diverts
the LNG production surplus, while the US shale gas with its high
variable cost and high sensitivity to LNG market prices cannot currently
compete with the cheap Russian gas. The International Energy Agency
(2017) forecasts flat demand and an average annual decline of −2.5%
for European production. This amounts up to 34 bcm deficit in the
2017–2022 period and possible more in the future. Nord Stream 2 aims
to close this gap.
Russia claims that renovating Ukrainian lines would cost more than
e9.5 bn, the construction cost of Nord Stream 2 (National Energy
Security Fund, 2016). The new route is shorter and more efficient due
to the inner pipeline coating which reduces friction and lowers the
amount of compression needed to push the gas through (Barnes, 2017).
Furthermore, alternatives, such as the planned Southern Gas Corridor,
connecting Azerbaijan to Europe, are too small to make any difference.
As a result of lower average EU gas prices, Hecking and Weiser (2017)
forecast a e13–35 bn annual welfare benefit for the EU-28.
Gazprom has also obtained half of the funds from five European
energy companies, suggesting that these firms also expect profits, al-
though four of them (Uniper and Wintershall from Germany, Engie
from France, and Shell from United Kingdom/Netherlands) are based
in countries that are clear beneficiaries of the project (cf. Table 3; the
fifth firm being the Austrian OMV).
On the other hand, Nord Stream 2 received harsh criticism from
both sides of the Atlantic. In March 2016, eight EU leaders, the prime
ministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Romania and the president of Lithuania have signed a letter
warning that Nord Stream 2 would generate ‘‘potentially destabilizing
geopolitical consequences’’. A European Parliament resolution adopted
in the same year describes Nord Stream 2 as harmful to energy security,
diversification and European solidarity (European Economic and Social
Committee, 2016). According to the European Policy Strategy Centre
(2016), the European Commission’s in-house think tank ‘‘Nord Stream
2, seen from a common EU perspective, is a project with neither
economic rationale nor political backing’’, furthermore the project far
exceeds the renovation costs of the Ukrainian route at e6 bn. Riley
(2016) argues that Nord Stream 2 threatens to plunge the Central
Eastern European states back into a pre-2004 market of greater supply
security risk and greater Russian leverage in their markets. Similar
concerns were raised before the construction of Nord Stream 1 and
these turned out to be well-founded. While Nord Stream 1 brought
new supplies to compensate declining internal production, EU officials
documented various abusive practices of Gazprom’s market power,
primarily in Eastern Europe (European Commission, 2018).
Ukraine alone is to lose an estimated $2 billion from transfer fees
and, to a lesser extent, the EU members Slovakia, Hungary and Poland
would be also harmed by Nord Stream 2 (Fischer, 2016) — violating
the principle of solidarity of Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. The European Commission has therefore proposed to explicitly
extend EU internal energy market rules to cover offshore gas pipelines.
The legal services of the Council of the European Union – where,
incidentally, the constructing countries have a blocking minority – has
opposed the legislative proposal. Eventually a compromise was reached
in February, 2019. Although the adopted text is less clear-cut than
the original proposal had been, it is the first document declaring the
Union’s jurisdiction over Nord Stream 2. It asserts, that the Mem-
ber State with the first interconnection point is primarily responsible
for applying EU rules on pipelines with third countries. The legal
framework for the entire pipeline will be established either through
bilateral German–Russian talks or an intergovernmental agreement
between the EU and Russia, negotiated by Germany or the European
Commission (Łoskot-Strachota, 2019).
There is already an infrastructure overcapacity in the EU in the
sense that imports amount to less than half of the existing infras-
tructure capacity (European Policy Strategy Centre, 2016). Finishing
Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream, Russia’s overall export capacity of
340.5 bcm (198.5 bcm without the Ukrainian corridor) will tower over
the 161 bcm of estimated upper limit of her exports to the region in
2025 (Vatansever, 2017). Nord Stream 2 does not diversify the EU’s
energy supply neither from an energy source perspective nor from a
route perspective as (i) Russia is already the main supplier of Europe
and (ii) the pipeline would lead to a concentration of routes in the Baltic
corridor. Similar concerns have been expressed by senior figures in the
US administration — although they are hardly impartial as Europe is
a prime target for future shale gas exports. Vainio (2019a,b) on the
other hand looks at energy transformation to renewables and the risks
related to ‘‘geopolitical changes in countries dependent on fossil fuel
production’’ Vainio (2018), that is, — sine nomine — Russia.
Both narratives have compelling elements, and both are true to
some extent (see Goldthau, 2016 for a more in-depth analysis). As
Fischer (2016) put it, the EU has to decide on what should drive its
natural gas policies: the market approach or the geopolitical approach.
In this paper, we aim to answer whether the concerns are well-founded
or not. We model the European gas network as a cooperative game
and numerically assess the influence of the stakeholders in the different
scenarios.
The structure of the paper is accordingly. After a brief literature
overview, we introduce our model, and explain the limitations. Next
we discuss the data we have used and present the main findings.
Finally, we discuss the possible network development alternatives in
the conclusion.
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2. Literature overview
The cooperative game theoretic approach in studying natural gas
networks was pioneered by Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), and was
soon followed by a number of papers that analysed different segments
of the European and Central Asian markets. Roson and Hubert (2015)
presents a detailed discussion of bargaining games on network markets.
Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) analyse how Russian natural gas
reaches the European market through the Eastern-European gas net-
work, and derived bargaining powers by calculating the Shapley-values
for the stakeholders. The scope of the paper is limited to seven coun-
tries, among which Russia was the only supplier. Hubert and Coblani
(2015) extend this framework to a full scale analysis of the Euro-
pean network comparing three scenarios corresponding to the Nord
Stream 1, Nabucco, and the South Stream pipeline projects. They
construct a cooperative game by calculating profits of coalitions. In
contrast, we focus on how much cost a coalition can save by cooper-
ation. An even more important difference is that instead of optimizing
the network flows of a coalition in one step, we do it iteratively,
country-by-country according to a given order. We do this in order
to obtain a more fitting model of the gas market with predominantly
long term bilateral contracts. One advantage of this approach is that
flows corresponding to the consumption of individual countries are
well-defined.
Cobanli (2014) also uses the cooperative approach to assess the
bargaining power of Central Asian countries. He considers various
projects, both East- and Westbound,2 and concludes that there is no
demand competition between Europe and China. To deal with the
externalities raised by the third-party-access policy imposed by the
EU regulations, Csercsik et al. (2019) replace the characteristic form
approach and represent the game in partition function form (Kóczy,
2018).
Among other approaches Holz et al. (2008) and recently Abada
et al. (2013) consider strategic, while others highly detailed numerical
models including the EUGAS model by Perner and Seeliger (2004);
the TIGER model developed by EWI Institute in Cologne (Petrovich
et al., 2016; Lochner, 2011); the ambitious Global Gas Model (Egging
et al., 2010). A non-linear model is presented by Bouwmeester and
Oosterhaven (2017).
Additionally, there is a handful of papers that offer scenario analy-
ses or consider the potential impact of new pipelines: Mitrova et al.
(2016) reviews a number of scenarios, including the disruption of
the Ukrainian transit, and conclude that the European gas mix is
fairly robust, and will include a significant share of natural gas from
Russia in all studied scenarios. Richter and Holz (2015) also analyses
Russian natural gas supply disruption scenarios using the Global Gas
Model. Dastan (2018) investigates the bargaining positions of Rus-
sia and Turkey in view of the Turkstream (formerly Turkish Stream)
project. Aune et al. (2017) use the numerical energy market model
LIBEMOD to investigate long-run effects of increased export capacity of
piped Russian gas. They find that the projects Nord Stream 2, Turkish
Stream and Power of China all lead to moderate increases in net total
Russian export, but the increases are lower than the capacities of the
new pipelines.
3. Model
In this section we describe our model. We are interested in cal-
culating the values of countries or country-groups, representing their
bargaining power. First, we shortly define the cooperative game the-
oretic framework, and the Shapley value. Following this, we describe
our modelling assumptions, and discuss how the coalitional values are
determined in our case.
2 Including the TAP, TANAP and TCP projects, which we also review in
Section 7.
3.1. Coalitional cooperative games
The bargaining between a buyer and a seller – or a consumer and
a producer – is best modelled by a cooperative game. When we have
more buyers and/or sellers we may also want to consider trades among
more than two players, especially when the transmission of the goods
must also be taken into account. Such trading groups are coalitions and
the members are the players. Of course, we can consider the possible
trade with any group or coalition of players — the realized utility is
called the characteristic value of the coalition.
Formally, the characteristic function 𝑣 ∶ 2𝑁 → R, where 𝑁 is
the set of players, gives the value a coalition is able to obtain via
cooperation without the help or participation of players outside the
coalition. One-member coalitions are termed singletons.
In our case, the values of the coalitions will be defined as the
savings resulting from transporting (trading) gas within the coalition.
We interpret these savings in the following context. We assume that
every consumer node of the network has a given (inelastic) demand
for gas. If this is not fully supplied, it must use its (expensive) backstop
source: alternative energy sources (renewables, coal, etc.), or alterna-
tive technologies requiring less energy. The backstop source can also be
interpreted as the cost of government intervention to mitigate damages
due to the gas shortage. The gain of a coalition is then the cost saving
from consuming natural gas instead of the expensive backstop source.
The cost function 𝑐 ∶ 2𝑁 → R assigns a non-negative value to each
coalition, the cost of supplying that coalition using only the network
connections and resources that are available within this coalition. Then
𝑣(𝑆) =
∑
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑐 ({𝑖}) − 𝑐(𝑆), (1)
that is, the difference between the cost of coalition 𝑆 and the total
cost of its members as singletons (when consumers use their backstop
sources).
Later in Section 3.5 we describe the details how the cost savings are
calculated for each coalition, and in Section 3.6 we provide an example
of how these values are calculated in the case of a simple network. In
the next subsection, we introduce the Shapley-value, which represents
the bargaining power of individual payers in a characteristic function
form cooperative game.
3.2. The Shapley-value
Usually, full cooperation is the most beneficial scenario for the play-
ers (that is players are expected to form the so-called grand coalition,
𝑁). On the other hand, it is not trivial how the gains of 𝑣(𝑁) are
divided.
The share a player manages to secure from the value of the grand
coalition 𝑣(𝑁) can be considered as an indicator of power. We discuss
different solution concepts in Section 6.3. In general, more successful
a player is in generating value for himself or others, the more he in
entitled from the whole cake.
In consumers-only coalitions there is no cost saving, each player
uses its backstop source. Similarly, without consumers there is no
opportunity for cost saving. Finally, in mixed coalitions, suppliers and
consumers without connections cannot reduce costs. Consequently,
when a player joins a coalition, his contributions can be one or more
of the following types: production, consumption and transit.
1. A new, inexpensive gas source is the most obvious way to reduce
costs by replacing some of the more expensive sources. By our
assumption, all players can satisfy demand by alternative energy
forms if no gas is available, so the first contribution is to replace
these alternative forms.
2. Producers cannot reduce costs unless there is demand. A con-
sumer would normally use its own backstop sources; in cooper-
ation these backstop sources are replaced by natural gas, thereby
saving costs. Therefore consumer countries create value (i.e. cost
saving) by having a demand that can be satisfied.
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3. Finally, gas must travel from producers to consumers. By linking
them, transit countries make the aforementioned savings possi-
ble. For existing routes, a less expensive alternative may also
reduce costs.
When a coalition forms, members join one-by-one, and each mem-
ber contributes a non-negative amount to the cost saving. Existing
members are not harmed if (almost all) of this saving is kept by the new
entrant. Considering all possible orders we can calculate the average
marginal contribution to the cost saving of each of the members of
the coalition. This is known as the Shapley-value (Shapley, 1953).
Formally, the Shapley-value of a player 𝑖, denoted by 𝜙𝑖(𝑣) can be
calculated as follows:
𝜙𝑖(𝑣) =
∑
𝑆⊂𝑁,𝑆∌𝑖
|𝑆|! (|𝑁 ⧵ 𝑆| − 1)!
|𝑁|!
(𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆)) (2)
where |𝑆| denotes the number of players in coalition 𝑆.
What do the Shapley-values tell us in our context? As our game will
represent natural gas trading on the European network, the Shapley-
values are the expected contributions of players to savings in the entire
European market. Regarding on consumers, the saving originates partly
from replacing the backstop source by cheaper gas and is partly from
helping others to save by providing transit lines. In the latter case part
of the saving is kept as a transit fee, which comes on top of the transfer
costs and can be seen as the profit of the transit operation. Both reduce
costs and with some simplification we can say that a higher Shapley-
value implies cheaper gas in a region. Much of the value is, however
is simply due to the size of countries. It is more interesting to see how
the power distribution changes with the network: what is the effect of
new pipelines built, who gain and who lose with them. Similarly, the
closing of certain pipelines may harm some, but may benefit others.
3.3. Modelling assumptions
In this subsection, we summarize the assumptions, which are used
through the modelling calculations.
Players. We identify the stakeholders of the gas market with countries,
represented by nodes in the graph of the pipeline network correspond-
ing to the main distribution hubs. Considering the strategic importance
of managing gas supply it seems fair to assume that production, trans-
portation and consumption are coordinated at the national level in each
country and is also in line with the strive for national energy authorities
as stipulated by the Third Energy Package. Note that the legislative
negotiations within the EU concerning the regulation of Nord Stream 2
also took place on a country level.
Demand. For each node, we assume a non-negative perfectly inelastic
demand (zero for source nodes).
Regions. For computational reasons – the calculation of the Shapley-
value is factorial (cf. Eq. (2)) – we need to simplify the player set.
We assume that certain countries always act together: join or leave
coalitions collectively. Players may then represent individual countries
or regions consisting of multiple nodes of the network. The latter is
an important point: The underlying pipeline network is unaffected;
supplies, demands and eventual flows are considered for each member
country separately.
Ordered players. We assume that suppliers focus first on the largest
markets that provide the largest part of their revenues: countries with
higher demand have, effectively, priority over countries who import
less gas. In the context of our model, this implies that ‘large’ players
grab the less expensive sources and the remaining supply (and transmis-
sion capacity) is shared among the rest. We formalize this assumption
in Section 3.5 and check for robustness in 6.2.
Transportation costs. Pipelines constitute the other component of the
network. While there may be specific costs to using each pipeline, we
assume that the transportation costs are uniform, proportional to the
volume and to the length of the pipeline (1.5 m$/bcm/100 km). Having
a fixed number is convenient both for estimation, but is also in line
with the mid-term goals in the European Union to liberalize access to
(international) pipelines.
Sourcing costs. In order to calculate the cost savings we specify the
production or sourcing cost for the suppliers and the price of the
alternative or backstop source for consumers. We use expert estimations
for sourcing costs; we assume that the Russian gas is somewhat cheaper
than the Norwegian and North-African gas. The price of the backstop
source is uniform across all consumers and is 2–3 times higher than the
sourcing cost. Our robustness analysis in Section 6.2 includes sensitivity
checks to sourcing costs and backstop prices.
Quality. We assume that the natural gas transported over the net-
work is homogeneous. Gas coming from different sources will differ in
calorific value by up to 10% (Chandra, 2006, Chapter 1). Interestingly,
consumers pay for the energy content, while for transportation capaci-
ties and costs the volume must be considered. As a result better quality
gas is a little less costly to transport. Taking calorific capacities into
account seems feasible, but transporting gases of different qualities over
the same pipeline segment can be difficult. Either we have to handle
‘cocktails’ or add a complex scheduling problem. Cancelling counter-
directional flows over the same pipeline is problematic if we do not
assume homogeneous gas sources, as the gas quality may not be the
same.
Now we move on to the technical details of our model.
3.4. Model formulation
We consider the European natural gas pipeline network as a graph,
where each country is represented by a node and the pipelines connect-
ing countries are the arcs of the network. The set of nodes is denoted
by 𝑉 , |𝑉 | = 𝑛 with a generic element denoted by 𝑖 or 𝑗. The set of
arcs is denoted by 𝐿, |𝐿| = 𝑚 with generic element 𝓁. The player set is
denoted by 𝑁 , a generic coalition by 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 . When 𝑁 is considered as a
coalition, we refer to it as the grand coalition. A player may correspond
to multiple nodes in the network.
Now, we turn to the physical characteristics of the network. The
network itself is described by an incidence matrix 𝐴 ∈ R𝑛×𝑚 where
𝐴𝑖𝓁 = −1 and 𝐴𝑗𝓁 = 1 means that arc 𝓁 runs from node 𝑖 to 𝑗.
Edges, representing the pipelines are characterized by a maximal
transfer capacity. The vector of transfer capacities is denoted by 𝑞.
Transporting gas over these pipelines has its costs. A pipeline may
travel across several regions and therefore it is convenient to define
costs by a cost matrix 𝐶 ∈ R𝑛×𝑚+ where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the cost of transferring a
unit gas over pipeline 𝑗 occurring in region 𝑖.
Each node is characterized by exogenous or perfectly inelastic de-
mand and a production value, 𝑑0 ∈ R𝑛+ denotes the vector of demands
and 𝑠0 ∈ R𝑛+ the vector of (maximum) supplies. In the following we
modify these to obtain the net demand and net production vectors,
𝑑, 𝑠 ∈ R𝑛+: There are fundamentally two types of regions: those where
the production capacity is higher than the domestic demand and those
where it is not. In the first group we assume that domestic consumption
is fully satisfied by domestic production, and domestic production is
reduced by this amount. In the latter the domestic consumption uses
up all the production and the net import is the remaining part. Hence,
we define
𝑑𝑖 = (𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠
0
𝑖 )
+ and 𝑠𝑖 =
|
|
|
𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠
0
𝑖
|
|
|
(3)
where (⋅)+ denotes the positive part, that is (𝑥)+ = max{𝑥, 0} for any
𝑥 ∈ R. Note, that if 𝑑0𝑖 > 𝑠
0
𝑖 , then country 𝑖 has no real excess supply,
still 𝑠𝑖 is positive. We will come back to this issue in a moment.
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As mentioned in Section 3.1, we assume that countries that do not
receive enough gas to satisfy their demand use some kind of backstop
source: We model it by providing the countries with a virtual energy
source that can satisfy all residual demand, but this alternative is more
expensive.
Production has different costs in different countries, in particular,
the backstop energy source has a unit price ?̄? that is (much) higher
than the cost at any of the producers. The price of producing one
unit of gas is called the sourcing cost and is represented by a vector
𝑝 ∈ R𝑛+. For consumer countries, where demand exceeds domestic
supply capacities, 𝑝𝑖 is set to ?̄? — the price of the backstop energy
source. That is, consumer countries also have supply capacities (that is
the reason we defined 𝑠𝑖 as
|
|
|
𝑑0𝑖 − 𝑠
0
𝑖
|
|
|
), but they can produce gas only for
the price of the backstop source (?̄?/bcm). This technical detail ensures
that each country can satisfy its own demand albeit in this case at a
higher price.
3.5. Optimal flows
In this subsection, we describe how the cost saving of a coalition is
determined as gas trade takes place on the available pipelines. The first
best approach would be to minimize the overall cost of satisfying all
demand. This can be done by transporting supplied gas to the demand
sites via the cheapest available route, but more expensive sources,
routes or even backstop sources may be used due to bottlenecks of
production or transportation capacities.
Under the optimum, which describes the cheapest possible supply
of a given coalition, the flow over the pipelines is given, but in the case
of multiple sources or consumption sites and branching flows it is not
clear which gas molecules turn left or right at a node. Hence, we cannot
necessarily distinguish between the flows of individual countries.
The approach we opted for resolves this issue. As foreshadowed in
Section 3.3, we assume that producers supply the larger consumers
first. In practice, this means that ‘large’ players grab the less expen-
sive sources and the remaining supply – and transmission capacity
– is shared among the rest. As a result, we may run out of transfer
capacity too soon making some smaller players unable to use optimal,
inexpensive sources. The overall cost will therefore increase, giving
us a second best solution: In the order of demand, countries satisfy
their needs at the lowest possible cost using the available sources and
transport capacities; this consumption is removed from the market and
for the next player the flows are calculated using residual production
and transfer capacities and so on.
Similar calculations are also possible when only a subset 𝑆 of
players participate in the network transfer. In this case the optimization
is restricted to the supply of the elements of 𝑆 using the production
and transportation capacities of 𝑆. The latter condition also implies
that only pipelines where both endpoints belong to the coalition can be
used. We do not exclude pipelines that travel through regions belonging
to a third party. Using these calculations the total cost of supplying the
coalition can be determined. Comparing this cost to the individual (sin-
gleton) costs of gas supply we obtain the cost saving due to cooperation.
The flow chart of this calculation process is shown in Fig. 1.
The iterative method we described here stands in contrast with
the approach of Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), Hubert and Coblani
(2015) and Cobanli (2014), where the optimal flows for each coalition
is calculated in one step. The natural gas market is driven by long-term
contracts. Suppliers negotiate with each consumer one-by-one. Here we
assume that bigger markets have priority over smaller ones. In case of
a capacity shortage this seemingly technical detail makes a difference.
In addition, we can distinguish between the flows of each player, even
when they are integrated in a coalition. Hence, the individual cost can
be accounted for, which is helpful if we want to keep track which region
benefits from the cheap Russian gas.
Note that because of the ordering the game is not superadditive,
that is there might exists some coalitions, 𝑆, 𝑇 such that 𝑆 ∩𝑇 = ∅ and
𝑣(𝑆) + 𝑣(𝑇 ) > 𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑇 ). The intuitive explanation is that, when a player
with higher priority joins a coalition, he may request that some cheap
gas previously supplied to a lower priority player should be delivered to
him. Although the amount of gas that is replaced by the backstop source
might not change, the overall cost of the coalition could decrease,
because the route from the supplier to the high priority player is longer
and more costly than the route to the low priority paper.
In the following, we define the formalism required for the determi-
nation of the cheapest possible supply of a coalition: the solution of a
linear programming (LP) problem. Readers who are less interested in
mathematical details should note that the following description is just
a simple flow model with multiple sources and sinks.
Formally, let 𝑓+𝓁 ∈ R+ denote the flow in the positive direction over
edge 𝓁, and let 𝑓−𝓁 ∈ R+ denote flow in the opposite direction, 𝑓
+ is the
vector of positive directional flows on all edges while 𝑓− is the vector
of negative directional flows on all edges. Let 𝐼 ∈ R𝑛+ denote the inlet
values at the nodes. The variable vector is then
𝑥 =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
𝑓+
𝑓−
𝐼
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
∈ R2𝑚+𝑛+ . (4)
Let 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑆 denote 𝑛-dimensional indicator vectors for player 𝑖 and
coalition 𝑆, respectively:
𝑒𝑖𝑘 =
{
1 if 𝑘 = 𝑖
0 otherwise
and 𝑒𝑆𝑘 =
{
1 if 𝑘 ∈ 𝑆
0 otherwise.
Let 𝐸𝑆 denote a diagonal matrix with 𝑒𝑆 over the diagonal, let 1𝑛 denote
an 𝑛-dimensional vector of 1’s, let 𝐼𝑘×𝑘 denote a 𝑘 dimensional identity
matrix, and let 0𝑘×𝑙 denote a 𝑘 × 𝑙-dimensional 0 matrix.
We now describe the linear programming problem and then inter-
pret the constraints. We minimize the cost of supplying player 𝑖 in
coalition 𝑆:
min
𝑥
(
1⊤𝑛 𝐶 1
⊤
𝑛 𝐶 𝑝
⊤) 𝑥 (5)
such that
[
𝐴 𝐴 𝐸𝑆
]
𝑥 = 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑖 (6)
𝐼𝑗 ≤ 𝑠𝑗 (7)
(
𝐼2𝑚×2𝑚 02𝑚×𝑛
)
𝑥 ≤
(
𝑞+
𝑞−
)
(8)
𝑥 ≥ 0 (9)
The objective function and the constraints are, actually, rather
straightforward. We want to minimize the total cost that is the sum
of the transportation costs in the positive direction, the transportation
costs in the negative direction and the cost of gas itself. Naturally, gas
does not flow over the same pipeline in both directions, it is only for
the purposes of calculation that we separated the two flows. The first
constraint explains that no gas is lost at any of the nodes: the total
of inputs, inflows, outflows must add up to the consumption (𝑑𝑖) that
is zero except for player 𝑖. Inlets cannot exceed the supply capacities.
The last condition merely insists on positivity. Finally constraint (8) ex-
plains that the flows must not exceed transmission capacities. Initially,3
we set 𝑞+ = 𝑞− = 𝑞. Then in each round we recalculate the capacities. If
over pipeline 𝑗 the two capacities have been 𝑞+𝑗 and 𝑞
−
𝑗 and a flow 𝑓 was
allocated, then the capacity in the positive direction becomes smaller:
𝑞+𝑗 − 𝑓 , but at the same time the capacity in the opposite direction has
been expanded to 𝑞−𝑗 + 𝑓 . The reason is that any flow in the opposite
direction would be realized by reducing flow in this direction. This, of
3 Each pipeline has a characteristic transmission capacity in each direction:
these are rarely symmetric. We could use these different capacities. Note,
however, that necessary compression facilities to inverse the flow can be built
at a relatively small cost. We therefore chose to consider the maximum of the
two capacities and calculate less constrained optima.
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of the iterative flow calculations for a given coalition.
course relies on the assumption that gas is commodity where molecules
are not labelled. We return to this assumption in the last section.
Let us summarize how the value of coalition 𝑣(𝑆), is computed.
1. For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 we compute the country’s singleton cost 𝑐(𝑖),
which is just ?̄? times its net consumption 𝑑𝑖.
2. In the predefined order (which depends on 𝑑𝑖) we compute the
individual costs of the countries using the above LP iteratively.
After each iteration we update the network (i.e. the flows and
capacities).
3. We set 𝑣(𝑆) = ∑𝑖∈𝑆 𝑐({𝑖}) − 𝑐(𝑆) where 𝑐(𝑆) is the sum of the
individual costs computed in Step 2.
3.6. Numerical example
Let us see an example how this works in practice. Consider the
network depicted by Fig. 2, where each node represents a country.
Four players are involved in this game, two suppliers 𝑆1, 𝑆2, and two
consumers 𝐶1, 𝐶2. Note that 𝐶1 is an aggregated region consisting of
two countries. The numbers inside the nodes represent the priority
ordering of the consumers, based on the decreasing ordering of their
consumption values (100, 60 and 40 respectively), as described in Sec-
tion 3.3. The numbers below the nodes show the available gas capacity
of the country in bcm. Positive gas capacity shows that the country
is a supplier, while negative gas capacity means that the country is a
consumer. The numbers above the nodes represent the sourcing cost,
or – in case of consumer countries – the price of the backstop source
(in m$s). To make things simple each pipeline has unlimited transfer
capacity and uniform transportation cost: 10 m$/bcm.
Let us see how the worth of the grand coalition (𝑁) is calculated.
First we look at the individual costs denoted by 𝑐({𝑖}) in Eq. (1),
which serve as reference in the process of determining the value of the
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Fig. 2. Example of a gas network game. Numbers below the nodes correspond to production/consumption amounts, while numbers above the nodes correspond to
production/backstop prices.
coalition. These cost are
𝑐(𝐶1) = (100 + 40) ⋅ 300 = 42000
𝑐(𝐶2) = 60 ⋅ 300 = 18000
Thus the sum of the individual costs is 60 000 (suppliers have a cost of
0).
As we consider the grand coalition, each pipeline and gas source
is available for the consumers. Consumer countries are served in their
order of priority.
The left node of 𝐶1 is the largest consumer and the first in the order-
ing. This node imports 100 units of gas from the cheapest source 𝑆1 for
125 m$/bcm (105 m$/bcm sourcing cost + 20 m$/bcm transportation
cost).
In the case of this simple example, the calculations of optimal flows
for the individual nodes are trivial, in general, this is done via solving
the LP described in Eqs. (5)–(9).
Node 𝐶2, the second in the ordering, imports 20 bcm from 𝑆1 and
the rest (as 𝑆1 is depleted) from 𝑆2. The problem is that the capacity of
𝐶2−𝐶1 pipeline is used in the reverse direction. The network operators
solve this by letting less amount of gas through, that is, 𝐶2 and the
leftmost node of 𝐶1 exchange gas molecules (but not suppliers). This
technicality does not affect the import cost, which is 20 ⋅ (105+10)+40 ⋅
(120 + 20) = 7900 m$/bcm. Finally, the rightmost node of 𝐶1 imports
from 𝑆2 for 40 ⋅ (120 + 20) = 5600 m$/bcm. The total cost and the
characteristic value (cost saving) of the grand coalition is,
𝑐(𝑁) = 12500 + 7900 + 5600 = 34000
𝑣(𝑁) =
∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑐(𝑖) − 𝑐(𝑁) = 60000 − 34000 = 26000.
The same steps are repeated for each coalition (with the actually
available lines and sources) to determine all costs and all values of the
characteristic function (Appendix A, Table A.5).
Once the characteristic function is determined, the Shapley-values
of the players can be determined via Eq. (2):
𝜙(𝑆1) = 6.72⋅103 𝜙(𝑆2) = 4.6⋅103 𝜙(𝐶1) = 7.97⋅103 𝜙(𝐶2) = 6.72⋅103.
4. Data and calculations
Considering the data, our first task is to specify the network we
consider. Our focus is on the international connections; we need to
make a number of simplifications and in the following we outline the
steps we had to take to make the network manageable.
4.1. Network simplifications
In our network model nodes are countries and arcs are international
pipelines.
By ‘‘country’’ we mean a geographical location and the arcs con-
necting them are typically combinations of international and national
pipeline segments. For the geographical location we use the main gas
distribution hub; in Italy, a long country with hubs in the North and the
South we picked an artificial location near Rome; in Germany, a coun-
try with a circular distribution network and multiple hubs we picked an
idealized point near Frankfurt. For idealized points pipeline-distances
are estimated. Russia operates with delivery prices. We provided the
sourcing costs at the border. There is no benefit in further modifying
to some hypothetical location inside the country and subtracting the
cost of internal transportation from the sourcing costs to later add them
back during the computations. The same applies to North-Africa, taken
as a single player.
For computational reasons – the calculation of the Shapley-value is
of non-polynomial complexity – we must reduce the number of players,
therefore we calculate the values of groups of countries or regions as
players (Fig. 3).
Finally, parallel pipelines connecting the same two countries were
combined into a single pipeline with aggregated capacity and average
length. Transportation costs were fixed at 1.5 m$/bcm/100 km on each
pipeline.
4.2. Liquefied natural gas
In the past years, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) appeared as a new
player on the European gas market. Liquefying is an alternative trans-
portation method with a very different cost structure: While the re-
quired infrastructure is expensive and liquefying and gasifying is ex-
pensive, as tankers use the evaporated gas – the loss – from their tanks,
distance-related transportation costs are negligible. LNG is a cheaper
transportation method for distances beyond 4000 km than delivering
compressed natural gas (Economides et al., 2006).
On the other hand supply depends very much on world market
conditions elsewhere. In the past East-Asia was the strongest LNG
market, lately more LNG appeared on the European market. Initially
to serve remote, poorly connected areas, but increasingly to input into
the pipeline network.
We include LNG as a new player with zero consumption, a pro-
duction corresponding to current LNG imports to Europe and links to
every player with significant LNG terminals. The low transportation
costs would create wormholes in the network, connecting remote nodes
with free pipelines so we shift the LNG source cost to transportation
cost by assuming long ‘‘pipelines’’ (see supplementary data in Appendix
B). Overall this does not affect the cost of using LNG.
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Fig. 3. Regions for calculating the Shapley-value.
Table 1
Sourcing costs and maximum supply by country.
Supplier Sourcing cost (m$/bcm) Supplied quantity (bcm)
Algeria 230 64.3
Central Asia 200 50.5
Denmark 225 1.9
Russia 220 192.8
Norway 225 118.7
LNG 240 56.6
backstop source 600 ∞
4.3. Sourcing costs
Table 1 compiles the sourcing costs. We assumed that the Russian
gas is somewhat cheaper than the Norwegian and North-African gas.
LNG is the most expensive alternative, however, it is still cheap com-
pared to the price of the backstop source. Although the Central Asian
sourcing cost appears to be lower than the Russian gas, considering the
transfer costs of the circa 2000 km long pipeline that delivers the gas,
it is equal in fact to the North-African sourcing cost.
4.4. Backstop sources
When local production and imports are insufficient to cover demand
some of the demand for natural gas must be directed to other energy
sources. In some cases this may be relatively easy, but in others nearly
impossible. Ideally such a model should take a detailed replacement
cost-function into account. In the absence of such information we have
taken the replacement cost to be 600 m$/bcm. This is 2–3 times higher
than the price of natural gas including transportation costs over the
most extreme distances: consuming gas is always preferred even if it is
far from the consumer. Our results proved to be robust to a wide range
of replacement costs (see Section 6.2).
4.5. Data sources and implementation
Fortunately, developments of the natural gas market are well doc-
umented and data concerning national resources like oil and gas are
published regularly by a number of reliable sources. Transmission
capacities were compiled from the data sheet provided by the Inter-
national Energy Agency (2020). Pipeline lengths were derived from
the European Natural Gas Network Map published by the European
Table 2
Data sources.
Data type Sources Homepage
Transmission capacities IEA www.iea.org
Pipeline length ENTSOG www.entsog.eu
Production/Consumption BP, www.bp.com,
IndexMundi www.indexmundi.com
Data verification EIA, www.eia.gov,
HEA www.mekh.hu/home
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG, 2019).
For consumption and production data we relied on the statistical year-
book of BP (2019). Missing data were gathered from IndexMundi,
which in turn uses CIA Factbook as a source. LNG data were obtained
from Rogers et al. (2018) and International Energy Agency (2020). We
used alternative sources to verify our database, like the US Energy
Information Administration and the private database of Hungarian
Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority. The reference year was
chosen as 2019 since at the time of the analysis this year had the most
complete data available. The dataset is provided in Appendix B (for the
sources see Table 2).
The model was implemented in the OPTI toolbox of MATLAB (Cur-
rie and Wilson, 2012), and the linear programming task was solved by
the CLP solver, using the Dual simplex method (Vasilyev and Ivanitskiy,
2001).
5. Results
We have made use of a number of simplifications to translate
a complex economic, engineering and even political problem into a
simple mathematical setting. The calculation of the Shapley-values is
based on the simplified game with 14 players. Beyond an evaluation of
the current network we have looked at two modifications.
Firstly, the 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis, when Russia stopped exports
via Ukraine was a scary incident for many countries in Southeastern
Europe. More recent events did not reduce Ukrainian–Russian tensions
and the risk of a future crisis remains high. As these pipelines are near-
ing the end of their service life, in the absence of refurbishment plans,
closing seems inevitable. Our first alternative scenario is therefore the
stopping of all Russian (and Central-Asian) gas exports via Ukraine.
Perhaps the most important recent and future development of the
network is the construction of the Nord Stream, the longest sub-sea
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pipeline in the world, directly connecting Russia and Germany over the
Baltic Sea. Nord Stream is already fully operational and its capacity is
planned to be doubled by 2020; our Nord Stream 2 scenario looks at
the network once the pipeline is completed.
At last, we consider a combined scenario: what happens if Nord
Stream 2 is fully developed and then the Ukrainian connection is shut
down: with the excess transportation capacities, Russia is likely to shift
gas transports to the more efficient pipeline to save costs even if we
ignore the geopolitical considerations (Vainio, 2019a,b).
Our results showing savings per region are presented in Table 3
and visually in Fig. 4. Since the figures exclude own consumption and
are showing savings with respect to the estimated backstop costs, the
absolute values are less interesting. What one should look at is the
change in incomes or savings. Substantial changes may have drastic
effects on a country’s consumer gas price and even its financial stability.
Shutting down the connection via Ukraine harms Ukraine... but also
Russia. It clearly affects Central-Eastern Europe negatively, since this
area is supplied mostly by Russia, via Ukraine. On the other hand
Norway, Algeria and the LNG suppliers come out positively, since they
can be more competitive. Poland improves its position as an important
transit country, but Slovakia and the Czech Republic lose this role. Sim-
ulations show that the Southeast Europe would have been negatively
affected without the recently commissioned Turkstream pipeline (see
Appendix B, Table B.7).
Expanding Nord Stream brings more Russian gas on the market, but
we also see that some of the gas gets rerouted. Most of the benefit goes
to Russia and Germany, while other suppliers and transit countries get
competitors: Norway gets much cheap Russian gas right at its doorstep,
Ukraine, Poland the Czech Republic, and Slovakia on the other hand,
can now be bypassed with most of the Russian gas export.
It is interesting to see how a combination of these two changes
would affect the players. Since Russia can bypass Ukraine via Nord
Stream, we expect that it becomes less important to maintain the con-
nection via Ukraine’s Brotherhood pipeline. We find that the country
that reaps the benefits again is Germany: it gets a direct connection
to cheap Russian gas, plus it becomes its main distributor in most of
Europe. Central-, and Eastern Europe is harmed, although to different
extent. Poland is less affected, due to the fact that it remains a transit
country. On the other hand, Ukraine, Central Europe and some part of
the Balkans are severely harmed in this scenario.
If we consider Nord Stream 2 as a certainty and view the closing of
the Ukrainian route as possibility occurring with some fix probability,
then we can take the expected outcome of the Nord Stream 2 and
Combined scenarios. Looking at the data like this, Western Europe
comes out as winner, while Eastern Europe suffer massive losses. From
this viewpoint, the political stance of the protesting Eastern European
countries seems perfectly logical.
Finally, let us address the validity of the fears expressed by Fischer
(2016), Riley (2016) and Vatansever (2017), namely, that Russia will
completely bypass the Ukrainian transit route. From Table 3 we see that
the closure of the Ukrainian route would decrease the Shapley-value of
Russia from +7.5% to 0.8%. A fair assumption would be that should
Russia decide to cease the supply through Ukraine, the Russian natural
gas export revenues would not decline more than 10%. The volume of
Russian export4 in 2017 was around $342 bn from which natural gas
took 5.2%, ca. $18 bn. Thus, the potential revenue loss for Russia is at
most $2 bn.
In comparison, the Crimean conflict and the ensuing economic sanc-
tions cost very likely more. Russian business newspaper, Kommersant
estimated5 the yearly cost of integrating Crimea into Russia around
$3 bn. The effects of sanctions on Russian GDP is less clear. Kholodilin
4 https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/all/show/
2017/.
5 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2425287 (In Russian).
and Netšunajev (2019) found weak evidence that Russian and euro
area GDPs declined as a result of the sanctions. On the other hand,
Bloomberg Economics calculated6 that the economy of Russia is more
than 10 percent smaller compared with what might have been expected
at the end of 2013. Admittedly, part of the loss is due to the plummeting
oil prices, but 60% of the gap, ca. $137 bn, can be attributed to the
sanctions.7 The truth is possibly in between these two estimations.
There are other costs, which are hidden or even harder to measure
numerically, e.g. that EU countries supported the suspension of nego-
tiations over Russia’s joining the OECD and the International Energy
Agency, for further details see a compilation in Tyll et al. (2018).
The point is, the Crimean conflict provided a precedent where Rus-
sia was willing to take financial losses to achieve political gains (both
domestic and international). The question is whether the geopolitical
gains exceed the costs of the closure of the Ukrainian route? In any
case, a credible threat will likely increase the geopolitical influence of
Russia.
6. Discussion
Our analysis uncovers strong predictions on the consequences of
Nord Stream 2 — but is also built on a number of assumptions. In this
section we discuss the possible relaxation of these assumptions and a
sensitivity analysis to a wide range of parameters.
6.1. Relaxing assumptions
We have started our analysis with a series of simplifying assump-
tions in Section 3.3. Now we return to these to check if these could be
relaxed — in the next subsection we also test the sensitivity to some of
the assumed parameters.
Transportation costs. The differences between transportation costs is
one of the arguments in support of Nord Stream 2 and yet we consider
homogeneous costs. We are also aware of the differences between
old pipelines and those still in the financing stage. Such differences
could be accounted for artificially by an appropriate adjustment of
pipeline length; a generalization to heterogeneous transportation costs
is also feasible. For Nord Stream 2, an optimistic estimate of a 20%
cut of transportation costs is equivalent to an 3.6 m$/bcm saving on
transportation costs, which is not a dealmaker for any of the countries
vis-à-vis the Ukraine route. Sensitivity analysis reveals that such a
change would alter the bargaining positions by a few decimal points.
Sourcing costs. In our model we assume uniform sourcing costs for all
consumers. Weiner (2016) reports a substantial variance between the
Russian export prices which cannot be explained by the difference of
transportation costs alone. Hinchey (2018) concludes that alternative
options, such as LNG, increase the consumers’ ability to lower prices
and so, in practice, deals with different consumers may vary consider-
ably. From a cooperative game theoretic point of view, however, it does
not matter which country is successful in the price negotiations. The
value of a coalition remains the same no matter whether the supplier
or the consumer manages to impose his will. The final transactional
price will only decide how this value is shared among the cooperating
parties.
Our model, where any consumer can buy gas from consumers at
the advertised price is somewhat different from reality. Consumers
purchase gas in two different ways: At commodity exchanges at major
pipeline hubs or – more commonly – via direct long-term contracts for
undisclosed prices. For such contracts the supplier takes responsibility
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-16/here-s-one-
measure-that-shows-sanctions-on-russia-are-working.
7 Russia’s GDP in 2013 was $2297 bn (source: https://data.worldbank.
org/).
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Fig. 4. Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario.
Table 3
Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario.
Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
Suppliers
S1 Russia, Belarus, Central Asia, Finland, Baltics 33 592 −12.1% 7.5% 0.8%
S2 Norway, Denmark 17 026 28.5% −14.6% −2.0%
S3 Algeria, Libya 8 518 31.6% −5.2% 3.6%
S4 LNG 7 673 33.2% −7.0% −0.5%
Western Europe
W1 Germany, Switzerland 18 295 0.0% 13.8% 23.8%
W2 UK, Ireland, Benelux 13 605 −2.8% 3.3% 0.7%
W3 France 6 859 −13.2% 8.4% 5.0%
W4 Spain, Portugal 6 423 −6.6% 1.6% 0.1%
W5 Italy 11 114 −9.2% 3.5% − 0.5%
Central Eastern Europe
E1 Ukraine 5 683 −71.8% −30.3% −69.9%
E2 Poland 4 040 39.4% −18.2% 0.7%
E3 Czech, Slovakia 2 996 −75.0% −22.0% −50.9%
E4 Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 3 206 −60.3% 5.5% −29.3%
E5 Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova 11 040 12.6% −1.1% 8.0%
for the delivery reserving transportation capacities. Undisclosed prices
mean that producers may apply favouritism and price discrimination
between consumers. The European Union is moving towards a more
transparent market similar to the one modelled in this paper.
In Section 6.2, we look at an alternative scenario, where all sourcing
costs (except LNG and backstop source) are set to 220 m$/bcm to check
robustness.
6.2. Robustness analysis
We have performed a sensitivity analysis to see how much the
obtained results depend on our modelling assumptions by looking at
seven alternative setups:
• All sourcing costs equal to 220;
• Price of the backstop source is increased/decreased by 20%;
• Transportation costs are increased/decreased by 20%;
• Countries are ordered by consumption from the smallest to the
largest one (i.e. in reverse order compared to the baseline);
• Transporting on Nord Stream 2 is 20% cheaper than the uniform
transportation cost.
Rather than presenting figures for these artificial scenarios, in Fig. 5,
we compare the changes in Shapley-values between scenarios under the
nominal parameters (black marker; data from Table 3) to their range
under varied parameters (box).
We have found that our results are robust: while each parameter
has a measurable impact on the Shapley-value small variations do not
change our main conclusion. In other words, the drastic shift in the
bargaining power of the players is due to the changes in the network,
namely the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the possible closure of
the Ukrainian route.
6.3. Shapley value or nucleolus?
There are several approaches to ‘‘solve’’ cooperative games. We
use the Shapley-value to calculate the power of the stakeholders. The
nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is also a possible choice for measuring
power (Montero, 2013). The nucleolus is obtained through a lexico-
graphic optimization process, where the profit of the poorest coalitions
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Fig. 5. Robustness analysis.
are maximized first. In this sense the nucleolus implements a kind
of social justice while the Shapley-value rewards productivity, as the
players’ payoffs depend on their marginal contributions. Thus, it is
not surprising that the Shapley-value proves to be a more reliable
indicator of power in distribution networks (Hubert and Ikonnikova,
2011; Hubert and Coblani, 2015).
The core of a cooperative game shares the savings in a way that
makes all coalitions happy, too: the total payoff of any coalition is
greater than or equal to its characteristic value. The Shapley-value is
commonly criticized for not – always – being a core allocation even
if the core is non-empty. In such a case part of the network would
refuse cooperation and would form a detached subnetwork reducing
the overall saving. In practice, such a secession is not possible due to
the complex legal framework supporting the pipeline network, but we
may want to eliminate such risks or tensions anyway.
The nucleolus always lies inside the core — provided that the core
is nonempty. There are various heuristics that make its computation
simpler than that of the Shapley-value (Solymosi and Sziklai, 2016).
For the sake of completeness, we have also computed the nucleoli (Ap-
pendix B, Table B.6) using a novel algorithm of Benedek et al. (2020).
The result has been verified using the Kohlberg-criteria (Kohlberg,
1971).
Much like Hubert and Coblani (2015), we have found it difficult to
interpret the numbers: Russia gains power when the Ukrainian route
gets closed down, then loses power when the Nord Stream 2 is built?
It is also hard to imagine that Norway becomes twelve times more
powerful in the Ukrainian scenario.
In two out of the four scenarios the advantage of the nucleolus
vanishes as the core of the game is empty, but even if the core is
nonempty it may produce counter-intuitive results: The cooperative
game that depicts the gas trade is very similar to a so-called glove
game. In a glove game owners of left (say suppliers) and right-hand
gloves (consumers) form valuable pairs (trade to reduce costs). In such
games, the core is strangely biased: The side with the fewer gloves gets
all the value. In our story, as the Ukrainian route and Nord Stream 2
gets switched on and off, the model alternates between over- and
undersupply, which in turn might swing any core-based solution from
one extreme to the other.
Another possible explanation is that the nucleolus focuses on the
satisfaction of coalitions without considering their size. For instance,
the satisfaction of Poland, and its complement coalition (the rest of
the countries) are treated equally important. Variants of the nucleolus,
the so-called per-capita nucleolus (Grotte, 1970), which considers the
satisfactions of coalitions normalized by their sizes or the proportional
nucleolus (Young et al., 1982), which considers relative satisfaction,
might be more suitable for such games if one insist on having a core
based solution.
7. Conclusion and policy implications
One interpretation of our result is that each country in Europe
is governed by self interest. The past positions/actions taken by the
countries strengthen this analysis. Jirušek (2020) inspects the attitude
of Visegrád countries towards the Nord Stream 2 project and concludes
that despite the declared unity, the Visegrád Group members pursue
their own goals determined by economic interests or long-standing
foreign policy stance.
Russia and Germany are the main beneficiaries and supporters of
the Nord Stream 2 project. Northeast Europe, namely, Poland, Ukraine,
Czech Republic and Slovakia oppose it because they will lose their
advantage as transit countries. Central- and Eastern Europe fear that the
construction of Nord Stream 2 will ultimately result in closing down the
Ukrainian route in which case there will be a shortage of cheap Russian
gas in the region. The Southeastern part is less affected thanks to the re-
cently commissioned Turkstream pipeline. Without Turkstream, Turkey
and neighbouring countries would have been in a much more difficult
position in the case of a supply disruption via Ukraine. Network flows
show, that even if Nord Stream 2 would provide significantly cheaper
gas, the benefits would never reach the Eastern part of Europe. A way to
maintain solidarity would be to introduce a compensation scheme or to
support the construction of a pipeline in the direction of the cancelled
Nabucco or South Stream pipelines.
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Table 4
Possible pipeline projects. Capacities (cap.) in bcm; date of commission.
Name Source Destination Integrate with Cap. Date
TANAP+ Georgia/Turkey Turkey/Greece SCP, TAP, Tesla? 15 n.a.
TAP Turkey/Greece Italy TANAP, Turkstream? 10–20 2020
IAP Albania Croatia TAP 5 n.a.
Tesla Turkey Austria Turkstream, TANAP? 27 n.a.
TCP Turkmenistan Azerbaijan SCP 30 n.a.
Persian Iran Turkey TANAP? 37–40 n.a.
East Med Israel Greece/Italy Cyprian gas fields 9–12 n.a.
One cannot but wonder if Nord Stream 2 and similar, somewhat
controversial developments are consequences of the changes in the
decision making in the Council of the European Union under the Lisbon
Treaty (Kóczy, 2012). The changes increased the Council’s ability to
act, but also along the interest of a smaller majority than before. The
changes have not affected all countries equally, medium sized countries
typically losing some of their power. While under earlier, Nice-rules
countries harmed by the project had formed a blocking minority, under
the new voting rules they do not.
It is worth considering how the situation in the European gas market
may change in the near future. The substantial investment costs, the
interstate nature of pipeline projects and rapidly changing geopolitical
interests make the gas network development very volatile. Hubert and
Coblani (2015) analyse, among others, the impact of the Nabucco and
South Stream projects, but by the time of publication both projects were
officially cancelled. Declining inland production and the need to in-
crease supply security, forces EU decision makers to commit themselves
on further developing the European gas network. Consequently there
is no shortage of project plans, but not all are equally viable. Table 4
summarizes the potential projects.
The most promising alternative of Russian gas is to connect Central
Asian gas fields with the European market. The Southern Gas Corridor
consist of three independent pipeline segment: the South Caucasus
Pipeline (SCP), the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The SCP connects the Shah Deniz gas
field of Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Eastern edge of Turkey. TAP
starts from the Turkish/Greek border and runs to Italy, first through Al-
bania, then under the Adriatic Sea. The recently commissioned TANAP
runs through Turkey connecting SCP and TAP. Although SCP has 25
bcm annual capacity, TANAP can only transmit 16 bcm, which is little
more than half of Western Turkey’s net gas demand. It is unlikely
that TAP will run dry though, as Turkey aims to increase TANAP’s
capacity to 22 bcm based on demand, and to 31 bcm immediately after
with additional investments8 and [Turkstream also became operational
recently]. Turkstream will also supply the Tesla pipeline which in turn
is planned to link the Black Sea with the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria.
The Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) would connect TAP with the planned
LNG terminal in Krk, Croatia.
Turkmenistan has the largest proven reserves of natural gas in
Central Asia, 9.4% of the world total. The planned Trans Caspian
Pipeline (TCP) would help to feed the SCP. The traditional route for
Turkmen gas to Europe is through Russia, which is supposedly not
happy of the prospect of having a competitor. Let us note that all the
Turkmen pipelines are owned by Gazprom.
Iran possesses even larger reserves, 18% of the world total, and
produces more gas than Qatar. However, it consumes nearly all of it.
Now and then there are rumours of the Persian Pipeline that would run
parallel with TAP and TANAP, but Iran has to invest in its production
first, as they already have a gas pipeline to Turkey, which they are yet
unable to fill.
8 https://www.tanap.com/media/news/turkey-historic-tanap-gas-pipeline-
project-goes-live/.
Although the production in Europe is declining, this is not true
for all countries. Romania may soon become a net exporter due to
the increasing production on the Black Sea. The Middle-East might
be another supply source. Apart from Iran, Egypt and Israel can also
become potential producers. The former due to the discovery of the
giant Zohr gas field, the latter due to rapidly developing gas industry
in the Levantine Basin.
Meanwhile market diversification is not only important for Europe.
Russia also made efforts to protect itself from disruptions. Visenescu
(2018) reports that Russia is shifting its attention towards ASEAN
markets. Ozawa et al. (2019) argue that the recently inaugurated Power
of Siberia pipeline can have the double positive effect of creating more
interstate stability between Russia and China plus greater regional and
international power for Russia as the emerging main supplier for the
Asia Pacific Region.
The profitability of these developments rests on many factors. No-
tably oil and LNG prices in general, which in turn depend on the
demand in Asia, and the costs of the production of shale gas in the
US (Rogers, 2015). Game theoretic analysis of the different scenarios
can help us deciding which projects will be realized in the future.
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Appendix A. Numerical example
Table A.5
The cost and characteristic function values of the example in Section 3.6.
𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆) 𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆) 𝑆 𝑐(𝑆) 𝑣(𝑆)
{𝑆1} 0 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶1} 42 000 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 38 800 21 200
{𝑆2} 0 0 {𝑆1 , 𝐶2} 6900 11 100 {𝑆2 , 𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 46 400 13 600
{𝐶1} 42 000 0 {𝑆2 , 𝐶1} 28 400 13 600 {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝐶1} 28 400 13 600
{𝐶2} 18 000 0 {𝑆2 , 𝐶2} 18 000 0 {𝑆1 , 𝑆2 , 𝐶2} 6900 11 100
{𝑆1 , 𝑆2} 0 0
{∅} 0 0 {𝐶1 , 𝐶2} 60 000 0 {𝑁} 34 000 26 000
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Table B.6
Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario using the nucleolus as a power measure.
Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
Suppliers
S1: Russia, Belarus, Central Asia, 24 567 0.5% 0.7% −6.9%Finland, Baltics
S2: Norway, Denmark 1 668 1191.8% −39.3% 80.4%
S3: Algeria, Libya 1 970 2.9% −4.5% 10.3%
S4: LNG 1 902 3.1% −7.6% 0.3%
Western Europe
W1: Germany, Switzerland 27 116 −22.0% 1.0% 8.8%
W2: UK, Ireland, Benelux 22 671 −41.3% 1.4% −6.2%
W3: France 14 777 −51.7% 1.8% 0.1%
W4: Spain, Portugal 9 831 −31.8% 1.3% 0.0%
W5: Italy 21 489 −37.1% 0.5% −1.1%
Central- Eastern- Europe
E1: Ukraine 2 436 −21.2% −9.7% −23.2%
E2: Poland 3 155 88.3% 0.2% 2.5%
E3: Czech Republic, Slovakia 2 303 −29.0% −2.4% −5.2%
E4: Austria, Hungary, 3 834 −24.6% −1.2% −14.4%Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia
E5: Turkey, Greece, 12 347 −2.4% 0.0% −0.3%Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova
Table B.7
Relative benefits per region versus the baseline scenario in 2016.
Base Relative change to base
(m$) Ukraine Nord Stream 2 Combined
Suppliers
S1: Russia(+Belarus), Central Asia, 29 430 −16.1% 7.2% −2.5%Finland, Baltics
S2: Norway, Denmark 15 451 33.1% −14.4% −2.7%
S3: Algeria(+Libya) 7 964 34.6% −4.6% 5.1%
S4: LNG 5 253 37.5% −5.7% −0.5%
Western Europe
W1: Germany(+Switzerland) 17 953 8.0% 11.7% 30.4%
W2: UK(+Ireland), Benelux 11 206 2.8% 3.0% 1.5%
W3: France 6 968 −11.9% 7.0% 4.1%
W4: Spain+Portugal 6 022 −5.2% 1.3% 0.0%
W5: Italy 10 359 −9.3% 3.2% −1.0%
Central- Eastern- and
Southern Europe
E1: Ukraine 5 495 −86.5% −27.2% −78.9%
E2: Poland 3 326 59.2% −19.0% 9.5%
E3: Czech Republic, Slovakia 2 755 −58.7% −18.8% −25.8%
E4: Austria, Hungary, 3 257 −62.8% 6.1% −32.4%Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia
E5: Turkey, Greece, 7 271 −1.9% −1.1% −0.3%Bulgaria, Romania(+Moldova)
Pipeline and LNG data can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111692.
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